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Mind the Gap: Virtue ethics and financial crisis 
 
The financial crisis has led to calls for increased regulation of the financial sector. In many 
respects this is uncontroversial because increased regulation should promote the behaviours we want to 
see, while limiting the behaviours we do not. This article takes issue with the idea that regulation, and 
guidelines, promote ethical behaviour in the way that we want them to. Firstly, judgement is often 
required to implement guidelines and regulations, which allows room for unethical behaviour. Secondly, 
we want financial professionals to behave ethically even when there are significant incentives not to; so, 
verifying compliance with regulations and guidelines when such incentives are absent isn’t a good gauge 
of the ethical status of financial professionals.  
The example of the valuation of the assets (Net Asset Value) of hedge funds illustrates these 
issues well. There are many rules governing how NAVs should be calculated, and while we can verify that 
a fund is abiding by the rules, the ability to manipulate the NAV remains. Furthermore, the incentive to 
do so is often only present during a crisis (usually to understate losses). Therefore, verifying compliance 
during ‘normal’ times is of little help in judging whether a manager will behave ethically when we most 
need him to. I first argue that the gap between compliance with regulations and ethical behaviour is best 
filled by the adoption of a virtue ethics approach, as discussed by Spalding & Oddo (2011), and Graafland 
& van de Ven (2011). I then discuss the implications of adopting such an approach for the financial 
industry’s codes of conduct, such as the CFA Institute’s ‘Code of Ethics and Standards of Professional 
Conduct’ (www.cfainstitute.org). Adopting a virtue ethics perspective would require a significant change 
in the emphasis of such codes.  
 
Background: NAV calculations and why they matter 
 Investors can give their money to funds, (including mutual funds, hedge funds and exchange 
traded funds), and these funds invest this money in a variety of financial instruments, such as equities, 
debt, derivatives, commodities and currencies. The Net Asset Value (NAV) is the total value of a fund’s 
assets, minus any liabilities. It is usually divided by the number of shares that the fund has outstanding, so 
is expressed as an NAV per share. It is calculated daily, weekly, or monthly. The NAV is important 
because it tells an investor how much their investment in a fund is worth. It is calculated by taking the 
‘fair value’ of all the assets (usually financial investments) in a portfolio.  
The Alternative Investment Management Association (AIMA), is an international organisation 
representing the alternative investment industry. They publish a “Guide to Sound Practices for Hedge 
Fund Valuation” which outlines how fair value, and a fund’s NAV should be calculated. The guide begins 
with the accounting standards and regulations (primarily the Alternative Investment Fund Managers 
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Directive which came into force in the EU in 2013), but extends these in various ways. In Europe, fair 
value is defined in the International Financial Reporting Standards as “the price that would be received to 
sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants” (AIMA 
Guide pg. 45). The US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles adopt a similar definition, which is “the 
price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability” (AIMA Guide pg. 45). This 
paper will not consider the valuation of liabilities: so liabilities will not be discussed further. Assets, 
according to both the US and European accounting standards, should therefore be valued at a price that a 
seller would receive for those assets.  
 In the case of listed equities---shares listed on major stock exchanges-- determining fair value, 
and by extension, calculating the NAV, is a relatively simple matter. The fair value of listed equities is the 
price at which other investors are bidding for those equities on a recognised stock exchange. Determining 
fair value is not so easy for other assets. The Financial Accounting Standards Board divides assets into 
three levels: 
 
Level 1 assets: Fair value is calculated by taking quoted prices in active markets for identical 
assets. This includes listed equities. 
Level 2 assets: Fair value is calculated by taking quoted prices for similar assets in active markets 
or quoted prices for identical or similar assets in markets that are not active or 
the use of inputs other than quoted prices included within level 1 that are 
observable directly or indirectly. This includes listed equities that do not trade 
very often. If a security last traded two weeks ago the prices available for it today 
can vary widely, and may depend on the amount of the security an investor is 
trying to buy or sell. Brokers may give different prices for the security, and if so, 
agreeing a fair value can be difficult. 
Level 3 assets: Fair value is calculated by taking unobservable inputs which represent the entity’s 
own assumptions of inputs that approximate those market participants would 
use. This includes private investments, for which there is no market. The ‘entity’ 
in this case is often the manager of the fund. (AIMA Guide. pg. 45) 
 
 The NAV tells an investor what their investment is worth. For this reason, it is important that 
NAV calculations are accurate. For the majority of mutual funds and exchange traded funds, NAV 
calculation is a relatively simple matter, but for hedge funds this process can be considerably more 
complicated. Hedge funds often invest in Level 2 and Level 3 assets and the flexibility in pricing these 
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assets gives rise to a conflict of interest for the manager of a fund. It is in the manager’s interests to have 
a higher NAV, because this suggests the fund has performed better than if it had a lower NAV.  
 In the EU, the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive makes the investment manager 
responsible for calculating the NAV, and states that they should ensure that valuations are “proper and 
independent” (AIMA Guide, pg. 7). The AIMA and the Standards Board for Alternative Investments 
(SBIA) augment the regulations and have both published recommended guidelines for fund managers. 
These guidelines make clear the importance of separating the function of managing a fund’s investments 
from calculating the NAV. In other words, the person (or people) responsible for making investments 
should not also be responsible for calculating how much those investments are worth. The SBIA state 
that hedge funds should appoint an independent administrator (a separate firm), which is responsible for 
calculating the NAV. However, the standards note that this is not always possible when assets are difficult 
to value. When this is the case, the SBIA suggest that the pricing function is separated from the 
management function within the firm. Furthermore, the valuation team should not be remunerated based 
on the performance of the fund. Where the fund management team are responsible for pricing, their 
input should be fully documented. It is also recommended that an external party evaluates the 
effectiveness of the valuation process. These guidelines are an attempt to ensure that the NAV is 
calculated in a reasonable manner (The Alternative Investment Standards, pg. 10-14). AIMA also 
emphasise the importance of objectivity in NAV calculations, noting that an independent valuation expert 
can be hired to value investments that are difficult to price. AIMA also suggest that a fund provides 
investors with a document which describes in detail the way in which the NAV is calculated (their 
suggested format is in Appendix 4 of their guide).  
 The SBIA and AIMA guidelines have been revised numerous times since their original 
publication to reflect changes in legislation, and to strengthen the guidelines to limit the potential for 
mispricing. AIMA recommend that the methodology for valuing assets is put into writing, and approved 
by a fund’s governing body (usually a board of directors). The governing body should also ensure that the 
valuation of assets in independent of the fund manager. Any involvement of the investment manager 
should be disclosed to investors. Where investment managers are involved in pricing assets, these 
functions should be separated within the investment management firm to limit the potential for conflicts 
of interest. The valuation of investments should be checked against independent pricing sources wherever 
possible. The SBIA and AIMA guidelines are therefore very similar, and emphasise accountability, 
thorough documentation, and the independence of pricing sources to limit conflicts of interest. 
 
Due Diligence: Assessing the NAV calculation process 
 When an investor wants to invest in a hedge fund they usually go through a process known as 
‘due diligence’. Due diligence means checking the information a manager has provided, including on the 
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NAV calculation process. AIMA also provide a list of questions that should be asked, to help investors 
with due diligence. This section describes the process by which the NAV calculation methodology is 
checked.  
 The most important question is that of who takes responsibility for calculating the NAV and, 
specifically, obtaining prices for the underlying securities. The most straightforward case is when the 
administrator is responsible for calculating the NAV, and gets prices from a recognised exchange. This is 
the case when a fund is invested in Level 1 assets.  
If a fund is invested in Level 2 or Level 3 assets, things become considerably more complicated. 
Ideally, these securities will be priced by the administrator. In some cases, the administrator can take 
quotes from brokers to price these securities. Brokers are intermediaries who quote bid and offer prices 
for specific types of securities. A potential investor will want to know that the administrator is going to 
brokers directly, rather than accepting prices given to them by the fund manager. However, in cases 
where there are few brokers quoting prices the fund manager is likely to have a close relationship with the 
brokers the administrator contacts. In theory, it is possible for the manager and broker to agree a price 
for ‘pricing purposes’. However, the administrators will often price the same, or similar, securities for 
different funds, so they may notice significant differences between quotes for the same security for 
different funds and query these prices. A potential investor will also need to check that the fund manager 
has not directed the administrator to specific brokers; it is preferable for the administrator to pick which 
brokers to ask for prices. A well-structured, and transparent pricing process, along with a responsible 
board of directors, and competent, independent administrator, should therefore considerably limit the 
scope for the mispricing of assets. 
However, a fund may also invest in securities for which there is no readily available price. These 
include private investments, and bespoke investments, including some derivatives, or very illiquid bonds. 
AIMA note that in these sorts of cases the investment manager may indeed have “the best insight with 
respect to the valuation of particular instruments” (AIMA Guide, pg. 30). In these cases, the fund 
manager may price these on the basis of a model of the expected cashflows for the security, prices for 
similar securities, or other models. AIMA say “Such tools, common in private equity valuation, are based 
on sound economic principles. However, many of the parameters used in such models are subjective, and 
the resulting valuation can vary widely depending upon a particular investment manager’s perspective of 
the current market risk premia and the probability distribution of future cash flows.” (AIMA Guide, pg. 
31) In other words, when a fund invests in Level 3 assets, there is flexibility in pricing some of these 
investments. A fund manager may, in good faith, calculate a fair value that turns out to be too high 
because they are optimistic about the future returns of the investment, or a fund manager might misprice 
such assets intentionally. The board of directors, and the appointment of an independent valuation 
expert, and transparency about the pricing process with investors all go some way towards mitigating this 
risk. A potential investor will also often seek to verify the reasonableness of the models used for pricing. 
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They will also want to see a structured, and independent, process for mediating disputes over valuations. 
Additionally, a potential investor may ask for full disclosure of a fund’s portfolio so that they can check 
the availability of prices for themselves. Nevertheless, when dealing with these sorts of assets it is 
impossible to mitigate the risk of mispricing entirely. For example, an independent valuation expert is 
likely to be less familiar with the investments than the fund manager and will only be called upon to 
perform a valuation periodically. 
To conclude this section, the AIMA and SBIA guidelines relating to NAV calculation are 
extensive and outline how best to ensure that the assets held by a fund are indeed priced at ‘fair value’. 
The due diligence process is extensive, and aims to mitigate the risk that a fund manager is mispricing 
their NAV. Nevertheless, these guidelines do not prescribe exactly how each investment is to be priced 
(this is an impossible task due to the evolving nature of investments) and, for some investments, room 
for judgement on the part of a fund manager remains. A fund manager may, therefore, be in compliance 
with all the guidelines, but use the room provided by this subjectivity to misprice investments in their 
portfolio. When faced with a fund investing in such assets, a potential investor will need to come to a 
conclusion about the fund manager’s trustworthiness. The second half of this paper discusses how this is 
possible. 
 
Due diligence is insufficient: Dynamic Decisions Fund 
 
  Successful completion of a due diligence process does not ensure that a fund manager will 
remain honest. The critical question for an investor is whether a fund manager will remain honest when 
they have an incentive to behave dishonestly. Verifying that behaviour is ethical in ‘normal’ times may not 
be indicative of how a person will behave when they have an incentive to behave dishonestly. This section 
uses a case study to illustrate this point. The third section of this paper will discuss how to fill the gap 
between the guidelines and ethical behaviour. 
 
The Dynamic Decisions Capital Management was a hedge fund launched in London in 
December 2004. The fund was founded by Alberto Micalizzi, an academic from Bocconi University and 
Imperial College. Micalizzi’s funds performed well until the financial crisis. According to the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA- the UK financial regulator) Decision Notice, the Dynamic Decisions Growth 
Premium Master Fund suffered “catastrophic losses amounting to approximately 85% of its NAV in 
volatile conditions following the collapse of Lehman Brothers.” (FCA, 2014, pg. 3). The Decision Notice 
adds that, rather than informing investors of these losses, these “losses were deliberately concealed from 
investors and other interested parties by Mr Alberto Micalizzi […] In order to conceal the losses from 
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investors, Mr Micalizzi entered into a series of contracts” (FCA, 2014, pg. 3-4). In other words, when 
faced with substantial losses due to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, Micalizzi tried to hide these losses 
from investors and reported an NAV that was inaccurate. Prior to the financial crisis there are no 
suggestions that Micalizzi was behaving any anything other than an honest manner. Micalizzi was fined 
£3,000,000 by the FCA. This was reduced on appeal to £2.7 million in 2014. 
The strategy of the Dynamic Decisions Growth Premium Master Fund was a liquid pairs trading 
strategy, which involved buying and selling equities on major exchanges. The portfolio manager 
(Micalizzi) tried to find two related stocks which were misvalued in relation to one another. He would 
then buy the undervalued one and short the overvalued one, on the assumption that the prices would 
move back into alignment. Because the misvaluations in cases like these are often small, the fund used 
leverage (borrowed) money to amplify returns. It was not, therefore, a fund for which it was difficult to 
calculate an NAV. The tribunal decision notice states that “In marketing material dated September 2008, 
for example, an overview of investment strategy and risk management policy spoke of stocks being 
accessed from a “highly liquid universe” of the S&P500 and the EuroStoxx 600” (Micalizzi v The 
Financial Conduct Authority, pg. 13). The fund did have an independent administrator, PNC Global 
Investment Servicing (Europe), which was subsequently subsumed within Bank of New York Mellon, and 
a board of directors.  
Between 1 January 2008 and 30 September 2008, the NAV of the fund increased from $352 
million to $437 million (Micalizzi v The Financial Conduct Authority, pg. 15). In October 2008, the fund 
recorded a profit of $5.25 million on its investments. It had lost $84.94 million on the pairs trading 
strategy, but recorded a $90.2 million profit on a bond. In November and December, losses on the main 
strategy were similarly offset against gains on a bond. The bond was an untraded bond which is 
summarised in the appeal documents in the following way “we do not consider that the bond was at any 
time a genuine financial instrument capable of providing any financial return or capable of being 
converted into a commodity.” (Micalizzi v The Financial Conduct Authority, pg. 18). The financial 
regulator, the FCA, argued that Micalizzi knew from the beginning that the bond was not genuine, but 
the appeal court decided that he did not initially realise that it wasn’t genuine. This was why they reduced 
the fine from £3 million to £2.7 million. However, the appeal court also found that “any reasonable due 
diligence would have given rise to serious questions as to the genuineness of the bonds” (Micalizzi v The 
Financial Conduct Authority, pg. 93). The appeal court decision document later states that Micalizzi 
showed a lack of integrity with regard to his “indifferent attitude” about whether the bonds were genuine 
or not (Micalizzi v The Financial Conduct Authority, pg. 95). The structure of the bond has no relevance 
to the argument in this chapter so will not be reviewed in detail here. It is sufficient to note that, even if 
genuine, it would have been a Level 3 asset.  
What is relevant for this paper is that Micalizzi tried to hide the losses on his main strategy by 
investing in the bond. A number of purchase agreements were entered into on different dates to buy the 
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bond, one of which was backdated. The appeal court document states that “In our judgement the only 
possible explanation for such backdating is that Mr Micalizzi, being aware of the losses that had been 
incurred on the main strategy, determined to conceal these losses by booking Purchase Agreement 1 at 
the end of October 2008, taking credit for the unrealised profit attributable to the discount from the face 
value of the bonds. This behaviour was dishonest.” (Micalizzi v The Financial Conduct Authority, pg. 95-
96). Micalizzi also misled investors about the NAV of the fund. He failed to communicate the losses on 
the main strategy to investors and the appeal court summary document says “This conduct of Mr 
Micalizzi is more, therefore, than lacking in integrity. It was dishonest. Mr Micalizzi deliberately 
misrepresented the position to investors, and failed to provide them with information as to the true 
position, even when it was clear that they had been misled by the original information. Such conduct can 
only be dishonest.” (Micalizzi v The Financial Conduct Authority, pg. 97).  
In summary, when faced with severe losses in his fund in September 2008, Micalizzi failed to 
inform investors of these losses. Instead, he invested in a bond, which was not genuine, and backdated 
part of this investment so that it offset losses in the main strategy. Both of these actions are unethical. 
However, it is not the case that Micalizzi was simply a man who habitually behaved unethically. The 
appeal court conclude that “This is, we accept, a sorry state of affairs for a man who, in other walks of his 
life, has apparently impressed with his integrity and honesty, as appears from references from third parties 
which Mr Micalizzi produced to us. But that cannot deflect from our clear findings that, at the time in 
question, and in connection with the Fund and the Bonds, Mr Micalizzi’s conduct was dishonest in many 
instances and overall lacked integrity. (Micalizzi v The Financial Conduct Authority, pg. 100) 
What we have, in this case, is a person who acted ethically, or at least, who we have no reason to 
suspect of acting unethically, until September 2008. Due diligence regarding the NAV calculation was 
made relatively simple because of the liquid strategy of the fund. A potential investor performing due 
diligence on his fund would, and presumably did, find that everything was in order. Nevertheless, when 
the fund lost money, Micalizzi acted unethically. The problem for investors is that due diligence, prior to 
September 2008, seems not to have provided any evidence about the likely future behaviour of Micalizzi. 
To rewrite the familiar disclaimer on financial products: past ethical behaviour is no guide to future 
ethical behaviour.  
One objection is that perhaps the due diligence process is unable to detect unethical behaviour. 
This is not the case. The problems at the Dynamic Decisions Fund were first reported to the FCA as a 
result of continuing due diligence on the fund. The Directors of the fund asked KPMG to provide a risk 
assessment on the bonds in November 2008. KPMG informed the FCA of concerns that they had about 
the bond. Investors also raised questions, which led to meetings in February and March 2009 between 
Dynamic Decisions Capital Management and the FCA. The fund’s compliance officer resigned. By 
December 2008 one of the investors in the fund (Natixis) wanted to withdraw their money from the fund 
because, based on discussions with the fund manager, they believed, amongst other things, that the fund 
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was in breach of its investment guidelines, and they were concerned about the level of the fund’s 
exposure to the bond (Micalizzi v The Financial Conduct Authority, pg. 53-60). Natixis subsequently did 
their own research on the bond and concluded that the bond’s reported value was inaccurate. Natixis 
reported Dynamic Decisions to the FCA on 12 February 2009. Morgan Stanley, one of the prime brokers, 
concluded after a meeting with Macalizzi that the “relationship with the funds would be terminated as 
soon as it could be” (Micalizzi v The Financial Conduct Authority, pg. 74). Furthermore, they alerted the 
administrator and fund’s directors to their concerns. Ongoing due diligence therefore did lead to the 
discovery of Micalizzi’s actions. While this is somewhat reassuring, it is of no consolation to investors 
who lost money in Micalizzi’s funds.  
What can provide reassurance that a fund manager will behave ethically over time as regards the 
NAV calculation process? It appears that due diligence works, but can only discover what has already 
taken place. This example illustrates that what is of critical importance is how a manager will behave in 
difficult situations where unethical behaviour is appealing. The following section argues that adopting a 
virtue ethics approach can go some way towards improving the chances of future ethical behaviour, in the 
face of incentives to behave unethically. 
 
Virtue and the Challenge of Investment Fund losses 
The previous section showed that Micalizzi was, initially, behaving ethically with regard to the 
calculation of the NAV of his fund. Due diligence on the NAV calculation process was not sufficient to 
demonstrate that Micalizzi would behave ethically in the future. In fact, he did not. The catalyst for this 
change in behaviour was the losses his fund suffered after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The question 
for those wanting to promote ethical behaviour in finance is: How can we encourage ethical behaviour 
when there are significant incentives to behave unethically?  
The appeal court documents describe Micalizzi’s behaviour as dishonest, and lacking in integrity. 
If we are seeking to encourage people to be honest we first need to understand what it is to be honest, 
and how an inclination towards honesty is affected by circumstances.  Wells and Graafland define 
honesty in the following way: 
At the heart of honesty is a commitment to impartiality, involving appropriate 
respect for the legitimate interests of others and the consideration of what an 
impartial spectator would consider right for someone in your position to say and 
do. Dishonesty consists in a self-serving partiality that systematically disrespects 
one’s interlocutors and relationship partners, that disrespects their autonomy by 
considering them in a purely instrumental way, for example, by failing to tell 
one’s commercial partners information they have a right to know. Honesty 
therefore goes beyond truth telling or ‘not-lying’ to include such general qualities 
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as sincerity and frankness which make trusting cooperation possible. But it also 
concerns the particular orientation and concerns that should follow the roles, 
relationships and promises that one enters into. One should become disposed to 
automatically consider the legitimate interests of one’s commercial partners—
whether they be customers, employees, or collaborators—and provide the 
information and service that they have a right to expect. (Wells and Graafland, 
2012, pg. 338-9) 
This definition fits the Micalizzi case because his behaviour failed to take into account the legitimate 
expectation of other investors that they would not be misled about the performance of the fund. 
Furthermore, an impartial spectator would have expected him not to attempt to cover up his losses. A 
further advantage of this definition of honesty is that it suggests a link between honesty and the ability to 
cooperate effectively, which is necessary for the functioning of financial markets.  
Why do people behave dishonestly when they have not previously done so? Wells and Graafland 
argue that competitive markets reward honesty, because transactions between participants depend on 
mutual cooperation, and trust. However, intense competition, with frequent replacement of market 
participants, can undermine tendencies towards honesty. This is because, when participants are trading 
with ever changing counterparties, reputational information is difficult to establish and quickly goes out 
of date.  
 This does not appear to be the reason why Micalizzi behaved dishonestly. Although he may have 
faced intense competition from other funds, it is not clear that this competition became more intense, or 
that market participants were frequently replaced. It is impossible to know exactly what motivated 
Micalizzi to act as he did, and the remainder of this paper will avoid speculation about his motives. 
Nevertheless, the idea that intense competition, or other situational factors affect whether people behave 
ethically, is worth exploring further. Mervyn King, the Governor of the Bank of England (King 2009) 
believed that the majority of people in the financial industry are “good men and women” but the problem 
during the financial crisis was “a matter of the incentives they face”. If situational factors make it more 
difficult to behave honestly, then there is a gap between what the rules and norms say we should do, and 
what we do in fact do when faced with situations that compromise our ability to behave honestly. 
Furthermore, there seems to be little we can do to mitigate this, except for trying to limit the occurrence 
of these difficult situations. 
The literature on financial ethics suggests a number of situational factors that increase the 
propensity for unethical behaviour. Behaving unethically in this context means behaving with disregard 
for the rules and norms that people know they should uphold, and which they have upheld in the past. 
People who behave dishonestly or unethically most of the time are a different problem. Alzola (2012) 
summarises the literature on situational limits on honest behaviour. He says that a person’s mood can 
affect their propensity to help someone in need, that we are more likely to help someone in need when on 
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our own (as opposed to being a member of a group), that we are less likely to help people when we are in 
a hurry, and that we are more likely to cause a person harm when instructed to do so by a person in 
authority than acting on our own.  In a business context, perceptions of a firm’s ethical culture, the 
attitudes of other employees and managers, informal incentives and the effects of leadership can all 
influence decision making (2012, pg. 381-383). Kim, Monge and Strudler (2015) discuss the phenomenon 
of ‘bounded ethicality’, which is when people’s capacity to act in accordance with their stated moral values 
is compromised by psychological limitations (2015, pg. 341). They discuss an experiment which suggests 
that auditors were unable to estimate a company’s financial worth impartially, even when they were 
committed to impartiality, and provided with a financial reward for being impartial. This study suggests 
that the role assigned to people can affect their impartiality. Although auditors were aware that their 
behaviour was influenced by their role as auditor for a particular company, they underestimated this 
influence and did not sufficiently adjust for it (2015, pg. 343). Lawrence and Kacmar (2017) try to analyse 
the psychological factors that lead to unethical behaviour. They suggest that job insecurity causes 
emotional exhaustion, which encourages unethical behaviour. They argue that emotionally exhausted 
people act unethically either to benefit themselves, or to benefit the firm they work for. They write, “Such 
activities might include providing false information to clients to ensure the organisation meets its 
quarterly goals” (2017, pg. 46). It is reasonable to suppose that during the financial crisis people working 
in the financial sector did feel that their jobs were less secure, and that they were also emotionally 
exhausted. These are the sorts of conditions in which we might expect people to behave dishonestly. 
At first sight, these studies suggest that consistent honest behaviour is difficult to achieve, 
particularly during stressful times. While people may behave honestly most of the time, and know that 
they should behave honestly, certain situations overwhelm their capacity to ‘do the right thing’. The only 
way out appears to be to limit the frequency of these situational factors. In other words, to limit 
emotional exhaustion, and job insecurity. Unfortunately, this is unlikely to be successful because the 
financial industry, at least as it is at the moment, is characterised by quick decision making, frequent 
crises, and a stressful working environment. But there is another approach we can take. The following 
section argues that there are a number of strategies available for limiting the impact of situational effects 
by changing the way that people react to them. 
 
Bridging the gap 
 Kim et al say that, in most psychological studies of bounded ethicality, not all subjects act against 
their moral obligations. They say, “Bounded ethicality may indeed be a pernicious influence, but there is 
no reason to think that it is an influence that competent people can’t handle” (2015, pg. 350). Their 
suggestions for handling such influences include “publicly sharing intended ethical choices with impartial 
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third parties” and fostering the ability to recognise when we are operating in a difficult environment, and 
dealing with ethical choices in a more deliberate manner. (2015, pg. 349).  
 Azola (2012) advocates developing ‘values’ as a way to mitigate the situationist challenge. He 
says:  
“If I value ‘honestly’ that entails that I want to be the sort of person who really wants to 
return the wallet I find in the street to its owner, even if the wallet is full of money that 
I desperately need. I do not want to be just someone who merely acknowledges a duty 
to return the wallet. To have a strong character is also a matter of cultivating the 
appropriate emotions. I will feel good rather than angry about giving the wallet back. 
Admittedly, even a person of strong character will be influenced by the environment. 
But a virtuous person will perceive situations correctly.” (2012, pg. 386) 
For Azola, cultivating a virtuous character enables people to overcome negative situational influences. 
However, there is more to virtue ethics than promoting ethical behaviour in response to specific 
situations. On the traditional, Aristotelian, conception of virtue ethics, living a virtuous life goes hand in 
hand with human flourishing. The traditional virtues are prudence, courage, moderation, justice and piety 
(Kamtekar, 2004, pg. 486). ‘Flourishing’ is usually understood to mean ‘real happiness’, or the sort of life 
that is worth living. Developing a virtuous character is a necessary part of leading a flourishing life. This 
flourishing may also extend beyond the virtuous person themselves. Flourishing may extend to the 
recipients of virtuous behaviour, or the community within which the virtuous person lives or works 
(Garcia, 2009, pg. 961) Virtue ethics is therefore at odds with the idea that judging which behaviours are 
ethical varies by context. McPherson describes this as the “compartmentalisation of morality into the 
various social roles we occupy whereby the norms that govern one sphere are viewed independently of 
the norms governing other spheres (2013, pg. 286). Developing a virtuous character is part of living a 
flourishing life, and a flourishing life encompasses all aspects of that life. 
Virtues are acquired through learning and habituation. If we repeatedly act in certain ways we 
come to have the underlying virtues “we become just by doing just actions, unjust by doing unjust 
actions, and so on” (Kamtekar, 2004, pg. 481). Usually under the guidance of someone who helps us to 
think about ethical dilemmas in a structured way, we begin to form virtuous habits. Learning to perform 
the correct action is insufficient, we must also become motivated act virtuously, and come to believe that 
behaving virtuously is good for us. “To learn to do what is virtuous is among other things to come to take 
the appropriate pleasure in doing it” (Kamtekar, 2004, pg. 481). By learning to live a virtuous life virtue 
ethics aims to give people the capacity to act ethically in unfamiliar situations. This is because habituation 
involves deliberating about the ethical thing to do in real, or imagined, situations.  
The ACCA agree that character has an important role to play in financial ethics, although they do 
not use the term ‘virtue ethics’. They write, “regulation can ultimately only be a backstop. It can make 
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rules for behaviour up to a point but the regulator is not in the room with the customer, the banker is and 
hence, it was argued, must have ethical underpinnings” (ACCA, 2014, pg. 5). In other words, while the 
regulator can make rules, the proper implementation of these depends on the good character of 
participants in financial markets. Importantly, this does not mean that a person will always succeed in 
overcoming these influences., but that they are committed to trying to do so. But how can such an 
approach be implemented in the financial sector? The following section discusses two approaches; the 
first makes recommendations for the institutions within which people work, and the second discuses 





 Moore (2012) argues that virtuous behaviour needs to be enshrined in the institutions within 
which people work. He suggests that it is not enough to encourage individuals to be virtuous, and to 
apply these virtues at work, because it is necessary that the institutional framework within which people 
operate enables the exercise of virtuous behaviour. There are a number of ways in which institutional 
frameworks can ‘crowd out’ virtue (aggressive competition and large bonuses are two oft cited 
mechanisms), so the challenge is to provide frameworks that ‘crowd in’ virtue. Moore suggests eight 
parameters:  
First, the organisation must be established with the aim of contributing to the good of the 
community. He notes that this entails continuous discussion about what the community’s good is, and 
how the firm can contribute to it.  
Second, organizations must assess and develop the character of employees. Individual virtues will 
be discussed in the following section. 
Third, organizations must design jobs so that employees have the opportunities to engage fully 
with the firm and its values. Deskilling of jobs, particularly at the lower end of the pay scale, is likely to 
reduce employee motivation.  
Fourth, executive pay needs to be curbed. Of particular importance is the gap between the 
highest and lowest paid within a firm. 
Fifth, decision making processes should allow employees to have a voice, and certain groups 
should not be privileged over others.  
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Sixth, organizations must trust employees and limit monitoring of job performance. Moore notes 
that trust, and trustworthiness, are usually cemented by reciprocal relationships, which are likely to foster 
cooperation. However, this conflicts, to a certain extent, with the expectation that financial institutions 
will apply strict risk management, which entails detailed monitoring of the financial products that a firm is 
exposed to.   
Seventh, organizations must encourage group identity. Moore notes that a sense of group identity 
has been shown to have a positive effect in social dilemma games involving cooperation. 
Eighth, organzations must implement a transparent governance system. Pay scales, decision 
making processes, should all be taken seriously, argues Moore. (Moore, pg. 309-311) 
 Graafland and van de Ven (2011) take a similar approach, recommending that financial 
institutions should be encouraged to pursue long term strategies, and to put service to consumers before 
their own interests. Institutional reform that fosters greater cooperation, longer term horizons, and more 
equitable pay are likely to provide employees with environments in which it is easier to behave honestly. 
However, these suggestions do not get to the heart of the problem that is at the centre of this paper. How 
can we encourage honest behaviour is those situations when dishonest behaviour becomes appealing? A 
positive institutional framework can only help, but is it enough?  
Dempsey (2015) argues that members of an institution participate in the corporate culture, and 
therefore bear a degree of moral responsibility for the other members of that institution. His focus is on 
moral responsibility for corporate wrongdoing. However, his wider assumption is relevant here. 
Institutions and individuals interact and therefore, in order to have institutions that foster ethical 
behaviour, these institutions need to be composed of individuals who are committed to acting ethically. 
The ACCA highlight a particular problem, which they call “the muddle in the middle” which describes 
the challenge faced by those trying to change a firm’s culture. It isn’t enough to change behaviour at the 
top of an organisation- to be fully implemented, cultural change needs to happen at all levels (2014, pg. 5). 
The role for individuals is clear from the list above. For example, assessing the ethical character of 
employees can only be done successfully by people who are themselves ethical, and ensuring that some 
groups are not privileged above others requires those intermediating discussions to behave ethically with 
regard to inclusiveness. The following section makes a number of suggestions. While suggestions for 
institutional reform are helpful, and may indeed encourage more ethical behaviour, implementing these 






 To begin with, it is worthwhile thinking about changes that could be made to ethical standards. 
The CFA Institute set the most widely recognised professional qualification for investment professionals. 
Their mission statement is “To lead the investment profession globally by promoting the highest 
standards of ethics, education, and professional excellence for the ultimate benefit of society” (see 
www.cfainstitute.org). A significant part of the course is devoted to ethics, and their “Code of Ethics and 
Standards of Professional Conduct” handbook is available online. The Code of Ethics states that 
members of the CFA Institute, as well as those preparing for exams, must: 
“Act with integrity, competence, diligence, respects and in an ethical manner with the public, 
clients, prospective clients, employers, employees, colleagues in the profession, and other participants in 
the global financial markets.” (www.cfainstitute.org) 
The other standards are worded in a similar way, outlining how members should behave, and 
what they should, and shouldn’t, do. The emphasis is therefore on behaviour, rather than character. As 
this article has argued, it is often not sufficient to know what one should or shouldn’t do, because the 
regulations often leave scope for dishonest behaviour, and because it is often difficult to do what we 
know we should do. One way to encourage behaviour that is consistently ethical is to focus on 
developing a virtuous character. It is worth considering, therefore, whether the professional standards 
that people are held to should emphasise ‘the kind of person’ they should aim to be, rather than the 
actions they should take. Audi (2012 pg. 288) notes that virtues enable people not just to do what should 
be done, but with the motivation to do so. He writes, “This motivational power of virtue is crucial for the 
question of what kind of person, or businessperson, one wants to be—and for the related question, How 
do I want to make my money?” (Audi, 2012, pg. 288 italics in original). The professional standards could be 
rewritten to say, “Strive to be the kind of person who always acts with integrity… etc” 
Changing the wording in ethical standards is unlikely to have the intended effects without 
accompaniment by more practical changes. A number of these have been proposed. Firstly, Kim et al 
(2015) note that publicly sharing ethical commitments can increase the likelihood that people behave as 
they hope they will. Boatright (2013) reviews the ‘Banker’s Oath’, modelled on the Hippocratic Oath, 
which has been adopted in the Netherlands. He concludes that the oath cannot be a good guide to 
behaviour because of the many difficult judgements that must be made by financial participants. 
Furthermore, taking an oath usually represents a commitment to be a particular type of person; this is the 
case for medical students and people appointed to public office. (Boatright, 2013, pg. 143 & 145). 
However, bankers do not become bankers when they take an oath. Boatwright writes, “the professions 
and public service have many bright lines, while banking is full of grey areas. Even very lengthy, legalistic 
bank codes are incapable of giving unambiguous guidance on some of the most ethically problematic 
situations that arise in banking” (2014, pg. 161). He adds that an oath, or code, can provide a starting 
point for developing sound ethical practice. In concert with other measures, such as a change in focus of 
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ethical codes, it might be that a public declaration (or declaration when one joins a new firm) focusing on 
the kind of person one will strive to be, could foster an ethically sound environment. 
 Teaching employees to recognise when they are in a situation that is likely to hinder ethical 
behaviour might be helpful. Learning to recognise when they are making decisions in a hurry, or when 
they are stressed, can help to slow down the decision-making process, and mitigate the pernicious effects 
of situationism (Kim et al, pg. 349). Kim et al note that doing this is difficult, but that the impact of 
situational factors is nevertheless not inevitable. Being able to discuss a particularly stressful situation, or 
decision with a competent (and ethical) person at the firm might also help this process. 
 Teaching new employees, or indeed students at business schools, about real ethical dilemmas 
they may face may lead them to consider their actions more carefully when they face such dilemmas in 
the real world. Ciulla (2010) suggests that business ethics is taught through history. She argues that by 
adding historical context to case studies students will gain a better understanding of the recurrent 
problems people face in a business context, as well as a richer conception of the values and motivations 
that shape people’s behaviour (Ciulla, 2010, pg. 342) For example, taking the case described earlier in the 
paper, students in business ethics courses might find it helpful to think about the incentives faced by a 
fund manager whose fund has lost a lot of money, and about the possible positive consequences of 
dishonesty. Trying to imagine the pressures, and incentives to behave dishonestly, and the reasons why 
one should still act honestly may help people to behave ethically if they find themselves under similar 
pressure. Discussing how to ensure that they behave honestly might also be helpful. Audi (2012) makes a 
similar point when he advocates taking a ‘narrative’ approach to business ethics. This involves thinking 
about historically relevant cases, or imagined cases, in evaluating a current ethical decision (pg. 282)  
 Public recognition of individuals who do not succumb to incentives to behave dishonestly would 
also help to foster a more ethical environment. Financial regulators, such as the FCA in the UK, publish 
sanctions and impose fines on members of the financial community. However, it might be useful to 
highlight noteworthy cases of ethical behaviour. For example, people who behaved ethically when they 
faced significant incentives not to, or individuals who refused to act unethically when ordered to do so by 
superiors, or individuals who reported unethical behaviour. Audi writes that “Nearly everyone wants to 
be considered (for instance) honest, fair, loyal, just, sincere, kind, and generous. These traits should be developed 
in moral education” (Audi, 2012, pg. 287) 
  
Conclusion 
 This paper has argued that regulations, and guidelines, do not, by themselves, ensure that 
financial professionals behave ethically. This was demonstrated with the example of the NAV calculation 
process. For some assets, a level of judgement is required to determine the fair value of these 
investments. The scope for judgement leaves room for intentional mispricing of the NAV. Although 
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investors usually perform thorough due diligence on such investments, these investors also need to form 
an opinion about the trustworthiness of the fund manager. Trustworthiness is of critical importance in 
the financial industry because financial professionals often face significant incentives to behave 
dishonestly. This was illustrated by the case of the Dynamic Decisions Fund. 
 The second half of this paper argued that adopting a virtue ethics approach can bridge the gap 
between regulations and guidelines on the one hand, and incentives to behave dishonestly on the other. It 
argued that, while institutional level changes may be helpful, it is necessary that individuals working in the 
financial industry are encouraged to develop virtuous characters. A number of ways of doing this were 
reviewed, including changing the emphasis of the CFA Institute Code of Ethics, teaching employees and 




ACCA (2014) Culture vs Regulation: what is needed to improve ethics in finance? Available on 
www.accaglobal.com 
AIMA (2013) AIMA’s Guide to Sound Practices for Hedge Fund Valuation. Available on 
www.aima.org  
Alzola, M. (2012) The Possibility of Virtue Business Ethics Quarterly 22.2. 377-404 
Audi, R. (2012) Virtue Ethics as a Resource in Business. Business Ethics Quarterly 22.2. 273-291 
Boatright, J. R. (2013) Swearing to be Virtuous: The Prospects of a Banker’s Oath. Review of Social 
Economy 71.2. 140-165 
CFA Institute (2014) Code of Ethics and Standards of Professional Conduct. Available on 
www.cfainstitute.org 
Ciulla, J. B. (2011) Is Business Ethics Getting Better? A Historical Perspective. 2010 Society for Business 
Ethics Presidential Address. Business Ethics Quarterly 21.2. 335-343 
Dempsey, J. (2015) Moral Responsibility, Shared Values, and Corporate Culture. Business Ethics 
Quarterly 25.3. 319-340 
FCA (2012) Decision Notice- Alberto Micalizzi. Accessed on www.fca.org.uk 




Garcia, J. L. A. (2009) Virtue ethics in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy Second Edition, 
edited by Robert Audi. Cambridge University Press 
Graafland, J. J.; van de Ven, B. (2011) The Credit Crisis and the Moral Responsibility of Professionals in 
Finance. Journal of Business Ethics 103.4. 605-619 
Kamtekar, R. (2004) Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of our Character. Ethics. 114.3.458-
491 
Kim, T. W.; Monge, R.; Strudler, A. (2015) Bounded Ethicality and The Principle that “Ought” implies 
“Can”. Business Ethics Quarterly 25.3. 341-361 
King, M. (2009) Speech by Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, to Scottish Business 
Organisations, Edinburgh, on Tuesday, 20 October, 2009. Available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech406.pdf 
Lawrence, E. R.; Kacmar, K. M. (2017) Exploring the Impact of Job Insecurity on Employees’ Unethical 
Behaviour. Business Ethics Quarterly 27.1. 39-70 
McPherson, D. (2013) Vocational Virtue Ethics: Prospects for a Virtue Ethics Approach to 
Business. Journal of Business Ethics 116 283-296 
Micalizzi v The Financial Conduct Authority (2014) Upper Tribunal Tax and Chancery Chamber. 
Reference nr: FS/2012/0016. Accessed on: 
 http://www.tribunals.gov.uk/financeandtax/Documents/decisions/Micalizzi-vFCA.pdf 
 Moore, G. (2012) The Virtue of Governance, the Governance of Virtue. Business Ethics Quarterly 22.2. 
293-318 
SBIA (2017) The Alternative Investment Standards. Available on www.sbia.org 
Spalding, A. D.; Oddo, A. (2011) It’s Time for Principles-Based Accounting Ethics. Journal of Business 
Ethics Supplement 1: The 16th Annual International Conference Promoting Business Ethics 49-59 
Wells, T.; Graafland, J. (2012) Adam Smith’s Bourgeois Virtues in Competition. Business Ethics 
Quarterly 22.2. 319-350 
